A Word in Favor of Limited Atonement

All Christians believe in limited atonement. The atonement does not save all men.

Arminians believe that the atonement is unlimited even though some men are not saved. What they mean is that Christ's work is intended for all men and any man equally and without any distinction. The limitation is strictly man's doing. Man exercises his free will and the way he exercises his will determines whether the atonement does him saving good. God's intention is universal and the application of the benefits of the atonement is particular, i.e., to those who believe.

Some Calvinists take the opposite view: Christ's atonement is intended for the elect exclusively and this limitation of intention limits the application. In this case both God's intention and the application of the benefits are particular.

In both the Arminian scheme and the Calvinistic, the application is particular. Only those who believe will be saved. The important difference between these two views is in the intention of God; in the one case it is strictly universal and in the other case it is strictly particular.

Are these the only possible positions? Some Calvinists take a different view of God's intention: a middle road or tertium quid. These Calvinists see both a universal intention and a particular intention in God's purposes and in the atonement itself. This is the position that I am advocating in this blog. I believe it is the position of John Calvin.

As I pointed out in a previous two-part blog post regarding the unity of the Trinity, (entitled "The Incongruity of Limited Atonement) the particular intention is reflected in the decree of election and the effectual call, while the universal intention is reflected in God's universal love (Matthew 5:45) and the general call (Acts 17:30).

Many who hold the "L" in TULIP these days, hold it strictly, i.e., they hold that the intention and the application are equally limited. I suggest that one can hold the "L" while also holding that there are universal aspects in the atonement, as there are universal aspects in God's love and in the call of the gospel. This involves no conflict within the Trinity.

These divergent intentions in God — universal and particular — are generally said to reflect different aspects of God's will (or even "two wills" in God). The particular intention is — prior to its execution in history — known only to God, while the universal intention is declared to all (in principle, though not in actuality) through revelation. These intentions correspond to God's secret will and His revealed will.

The secret will and the revealed will are often (usually?) at variance from one another, but we ought not (it seems to me) to consider one as "more real" than the other. The secret will is not more real because it is actually carried into fruition, nor is it less real though it is often contrary to that which is revealed as God's will. For Christians committed to the authority of the scripture and the Holiness of God, both His revealed will and His secret will must be considered real, meaningful, and in keeping with His Holy character.

This may involve us in mysteries, but this cannot be avoided by any method than smoothing out one's theology to fit with one's biases. One may smooth out the theology in the Arminian way, by denying all sovereign interference in man's will. In this theology, God effectively has no secret will: man decides his own course. One may smooth out the theology in the way of certain Calvinists by exalting the secret will to primary status and relegating the revealed will to irrelevancy or nonexistence. In this theology, God effectively has no revealed will and man's volitions become meaningless.

It seems to me that both ways are wrong.

I submit that the middle way is the way of Calvin. We can see this in his commentary on 2Peter 3:9. Though this comment does not directly relate to the atonement, it does reflect Calvin's universalism in respect of God's love and his view of the secret and revealed will of God:

But the Lord is not slack, or, delays not. He checks extreme and unreasonable haste by another reason, that is, that the Lord defers his coming that he might invite all mankind to repentance.

* * *

And as to the duration of the whole world, we must think exactly the same as of the life of every individual; for God by prolonging time to each, sustains him that he may repent. In the like manner he does not hasten the end of the world, in order to give to all time to repent.

This is a very necessary admonition, so that we may learn to employ time aright, as we shall otherwise suffer a just punishment for our idleness.

Not willing that any should perish. So wonderful is his love towards mankind, that he would have them all to be saved, and is of his own self prepared to bestow salvation on the lost. But the order is to be noticed, that God is ready to receive all to repentance, so that none may perish; for in these words the way and manner of obtaining salvation is pointed out. Every one of us, therefore, who is desirous of salvation, must learn to enter in by this way.

But it may be asked, If God wishes none to perish, why is it that so many do perish? To this my answer is, that no mention is here made of the hidden purpose of God, according to which the reprobate are doomed to their own ruin, but only of his will as made known to us in the gospel. For God there stretches forth his hand without a difference to all, but lays hold only of those, to lead them to himself, whom he has chosen before the foundation of the world.

Re-read this passage in Calvin and notice some things. Notice the universality: "all mankind," "give to all time to repent," love towards mankind, all to be saved, etc. But notice also the particularity reflected in the final paragraph. The reprobate are doomed to their own ruin while God lays hold of those whom he has chosen before the foundation of the world.

More importantly for my purposes in this article, notice Calvin's reference to God's hidden purpose one the one hand and his will as made known to us in the gospel on the other hand. In God's hidden purpose, "the reprobate are doomed to their own ruin." While in God's will as expressed in the gospel, he "stretches forth his hand without a difference to all." There we have the difference between the secret will and the revealed will taught by Calvin himself. And these two aspects of God's will are particular and universal respectively.

So I do hold to limited atonement. I hold that God has a special love for his elect, which is reflected in Christ's work for his church, and results in the effectual call of the Holy Spirit. I also hold that in some ways the atonement is for all men. I hold that God has love for all men, which is reflected in his sending Christ to save the world, and results in the general call of the gospel to any who will hear.

How do I hold to limited atonement? In this way:

For therefore we both labour and suffer reproach, because we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, specially of those that believe.

1Timothy 4:10

Technorati Tags: john calvin, calvinism, limited atonement, reformed theology, unlimited atonement

Calvin's View of the Atonement - Conclusion

Well ... not really a conclusion, but a breathing point. I want to briefly summarize the previous seven blog articles before moving further. In the previous seven articles, I have been rebutting the high Calvinists' reading of Calvin's theology of the atonement.

It is commonly believed that Calvin taught limited atonement. "Of course he did!" they will say. Challenges to this notion are met with derision. But what is the proof? The proof, as far as I can tell, is grouped in three major areas. I will start with Heshusius.

Heshusius the bruised reed

Though the comment made by Calvin against Heshusius is considered the strongest point for the limited atonement side, it is actually quite thin. The words, taken by themselves, do seem to support limited atonement, but I have given six reasons, listed below, why this reading of Heshusius should not be accepted.

1. The context of Calvin's theology as a whole does not include limited atonement
2. The context of Calvin's tract against Heshusius excludes limited atonement
3. In the famous Heshusius quote, "wicked" does not mean "non-elect."
4. Limited atonement is meaningless and out of place in Calvin's argument against Heshusius
5. Limited atonement refutes Calvin's own theology of The Lord's Supper as presented and defended by Calvin in the Heshusius tract
6. In the Heshusius tract, Calvin argued against Christ's local bodily presence in the elements of the Lord's Supper, not against unlimited atonement

For more details on any of the reasons given above, click on the link for a more detailed discussion of the argument.

1John 2:2

The limited atonement advocate will sometimes list Calvin's commentary on 1John 2:2 as somehow aiding him in his quest. But the 1John 2:2 comment is irrelevant at best, and damaging to the limited atonement case at worst.

At its best for the limited atonement advocate, the comment is irrelevant to the issue. It says nothing whatsoever in favor of limited atonement apart from the application of this one verse to the question.

But the big problem with 1John 2:2, from the limited atonement advocate's point of view, is that it contains Calvin's assent to the famous formula of reformed theology on the atonement, "sufficient for all, efficient for the elect." That alone is a blow, but, as ynottony pointed out in a comment, Calvin says that Christ "suffered sufficiently for the whole world," which denies the idea of a limited imputation of the sins of the elect alone to Christ.

Calvin's Predestinarianism

And finally we come to Calvin's strong predestinarianism. It is imagined by some that whenever Calvin speaks of unconditional election, predestination, salvation by grace, and similar doctrines, that he is implicitly affirming limited atonement. I pointed out the logical error in this idea in the first article in this series. In future articles I will make the strong positive case from Calvin's writings to add evidence to logic.

Conclusion

In sum, the three main arguments for seeing limited atonement in Calvin are based on incomplete and inaccurate reading of Calvin and fallacious reasoning.

Technorati Tags: john calvin, calvinism, reformed theology, limited atonement, unlimited atonement

Calvin's View of the Atonement - Part VII

The Spiritual v. the Physical Presence of Christ

Continuing the discourse of previous essay, I resume the review of the passage in Calvin's tract against Heshusius that contains the famous, vaunted, and (if I am correct) much misunderstood "limited atonement" quotation. The reader may need to go back to that previous blog post to pick up the threads of my argument. In the first sentence of the passage I quoted, Calvin makes this objection:

Christ cannot be separated from his Spirit.

Calvin makes this objection in response to the idea that the wicked partake of Christ's flesh in the Lord's Supper. Christ cannot be separated from his Spirit, Calvin says, and thus merely eating the flesh of Christ apart from the Spirit of Christ is impossible. The reader should keep in mind that Calvin did hold that Christ's flesh, or His body, is present in the elements of the Lord's Supper. The difference between Calvin and Heshusius on this point is that Heshusius held to a physical presence, whereas Calvin held that this presence, though substantial, is spiritual and mysterious. Calvin says in this tract,

it is declared in my writings more than a hundred times, that so far am I from rejecting the term substance, that I ingenuously and readily declare, that by the incomprehensible agency of the Spirit, spiritual life is infused into us from the substance of the flesh of Christ. I also constantly admit that we are substantially fed on the flesh and blood of Christ....

Heshusius relies on wooden literalism

The substance of Heshusius's argument — as related by Calvin — is summed up in the next sentence:

His answer is, that as the words of Paul are clear, he assents to them.

Heshusius relies on a strictly literal reading of 1Corinthians 11:24, "this is my body." For Heshusius, the literal meaning of the words answers all objections. It is important to recognize his heavy-handed literalism to understand both the issue in dispute and Calvin's arguments. This is why Calvin asked questions of Heshusius throughout the tract regarding the physical nature of the flesh of Christ in the elements: is the flesh chewed with the teeth? how long is it retained in the body? and such like.

It is also important to understand that Heshusius insists on the literal meaning of the words. We will come to this again later.

The benefits of the Supper enjoyed only by faith

The next section of this passage contains the part of the dispute between Calvin and Heshusius related to the spiritual benefits of the Lord's Supper and how one might partake of those benefits. I begin this next quotation with the sentence already given above that relates Heshusius's inelegant literalism:

His answer is, that as the words of Paul are clear, he assents to them. Does he mean to astonish us by a miracle when he tells us that the blind see it? It has been clearly enough shown that nothing of the kind is to be seen in the words of Paul. He endeavors to disentangle himself by saying, that Christ is present with his creatures in many ways. But the first thing to be explained is, how Christ is present with unbelievers, as being the spiritual food of souls, and, in short, the life and salvation of the world.

Emphasis added. In these sentences, Calvin focuses on the difference between the literal presence of Christ's body in the elements and the spiritual benefits that must be enjoyed by faith. And that is how we can understand the emphasized sentence at the end of the passage. Since, by Heshusius's own principles, the wicked do not benefit by Christ's presence in the Lord's Supper, Calvin drives home the point that faith is required to enjoy the benefits promised in the Eucharist. This is Calvin's main thrust. Faith is required to enjoy the benefits of Christ's sacrifice offered in the Eucharist, not Christ's bodily presence. Thus, though unbelievers are offered these benefits, they do not receive them because they have no faith. On this point Calvin has reduced Heshusius to an absurdity using principles that Heshusius himself espouses.

The critical sentence

And now, at last, we come to the critical sentence. But this time we come to it fully prepared. Here it is.

And as he adheres so doggedly to the words, I should like to know how the wicked can eat the flesh of Christ which was not crucified for them? and how they can drink the blood which was not shed to expiate their sins?

First we note the reference to Heshusius's literalism: "as he adheres so doggedly to the words...." Calvin is setting us up for another reductio relying on Heshusius's clumsy dependence on the literal meaning of words.

"I should like to know...." Calvin uses these words to introduce his challenge to Heshusius. As I noted previously (reason four), this challenge must be on principles Heshusius would agree to or Calvin's argument would be meaningless.

"how the wicked can eat the flesh of Christ...." Clearly Calvin is speaking of the local bodily presence of Christ's flesh in the bread, as opposed to the spiritual benefits. Calvin has already posed the question related to the spiritual benefits of the Lord's Supper in the previous sentence. Now he passes to the physical eating. This is the main point in dispute. It should not surprise us to see the bodily presence of Christ in the elements as the subject of a reductio ad absurdum when the bodily presence is the principal bone of contention.

"which was not crucified for them?" In Lutheran theology, this point is referred to in at least two of their confessional documents. In Luther's Large Catechism, in the section titled "The Sacrament of the Altar," we find this statement:

Therefore also it is vain talk when they say that the body and blood of Christ are not given and shed for us in the Lord's Supper, hence we could not have forgiveness of sins in the Sacrament. For although the work is accomplished and the forgiveness of sins acquired on the cross, yet it cannot come to us in any other way than through the Word.

Notice that Lutheran doctrine explicitly denies that the body and blood of Christ are "given and shed for us in the Lord's Supper...." The work, the Lutherans hold, was accomplished on the cross, not in the Eucharist. This is further reinforced in the Augsburg Confession, Article XXIV, where private masses are condemned and Christ's once sacrifice for sin is asserted.

For Christ's passion was an oblation and satisfaction, not for guilt only, but also for all other sins, as it is written to the Hebrews, 10:10: 'We are sanctificed through the offering of Jesus Christ once for all.'

Augsburg Confession XXIV

Thus Lutheran theology specifically denies that the body of Christ, though present in the Eucharist, is sacrificed in the Eucharist. I suggest that it is this that Calvin refers to in his famous challenge. Calvin is asking how the wicked eat the flesh of Christ, which, though it is physically present in the bread, has not been sacrificed?

To reinforce this, we may also recall Paul's words in 1Corinthians, which Heshusius insists upon so doggedly: "Take, eat: this is my body, which is broken for you...." Since Heshusius relies so strongly on the words for the physical ingestion of Christ's flesh, how can he account for the flesh not being offered as a sacrifice as in the Catholic Mass? He insists upon "this is my body," but is not so reliant on the words "which is broken for you." As Calvin suggested earlier, the Catholics are "considerably more modest and more sober."

Thus we have come to a satisfactory understanding of Calvin's challenge, which involves no contradiction to his own theology, uses Heshusius's accepted principles for a reductio ad absurdum argument, is in keeping with the tone of the dispute between the two men, and addresses the matter that is actually being debated between them. Whereas the limited atonement argument, as suggested by the high Calvinists, meets none of those criteria.

(I must credit my friend Terry West for suggesting the comparison to the Catholic Mass. I was struggling with Calvin's argument about the physical presence of Christ's flesh in the bread and how that could relate to the sacrifice of Christ, when Terry suggested, quite brilliantly as is his wont, the parallel to the Catholic Mass. The idea proved more fertile the more I pursued it. Thanks Terry!)

Technorati Tags: john calvin, calvinism, reformed theology, limited atonement, unlimited atonement, heshusius

Calvin's View of the Atonement - Part VI

Another Way to Understand Heshusius

The problem with the high Calvinists' understanding of Calvin's tract against Heshusius is that — given their understanding of it — the quote they rely on is so jarringly out of place. It doesn't fit with Calvin's theology or with his argument against Heshusius. Here is the quote. But this time I'm going to provide a larger portion of the paragraph.

It is worth while to observe in passing, with what acuteness he disposes of my objection, that Christ cannot be separated from his Spirit. His answer is, that as the words of Paul are clear, he assents to them. Does he mean to astonish us by a miracle when he tells us that the blind see it? It has been clearly enough shown that nothing of the kind is to be seen in the words of Paul. He endeavors to disentangle himself by saying, that Christ is present with his creatures in many ways. But the first thing to be explained is, how Christ is present with unbelievers, as being the spiritual food of souls, and, in short, the life and salvation of the world. And as he adheres so doggedly to the words, I should like to know how the wicked can eat the flesh of Christ which was not crucified for them? and how they can drink the blood which was not shed to expiate their sins? I agree with him, that Christ is present as a strict judge when his Supper is profaned. But it is one thing to be eaten, and another to be a judge.

I am going to review this passage to illustrate the substance and method of Calvin's argument against Heshusius. In so doing we will (if I attain my objectives) have a brief survey of the entire tract. But first, I present reason number six for rejecting the Heshusius tract as an argument for Calvin's teaching of limited atonement:

6) Calvin argued against Christ's local bodily presence in the elements of the Lord's Supper, not against unlimited atonement

The dispute between Calvin and Heshusius was not the atonement, it was Christ's local bodily presence in the Eucharistic elements. Calvin himself states the matter in contention as follows:

Hence it follows, that our dispute relates neither to presence nor to substantial eating, but only as to the mode of both. We neither admit a local presence, nor that gross or rather brutish eating of which Heshusius talks so absurdly when he says, that Christ in respect of his human nature is present on the earth in the substance of his body and blood, so that he is not only eaten in faith by his saints, but also by the mouth bodily without faith by the wicked.

For the sake of clarity, I should point out that Calvin does not dispute Christ's presence in the elements, but the mode of His presence in the elements. Notice also that the local bodily presence of Christ in the elements brings up two other issues, viz., Christ's bodily presence on earth and the wicked's partaking of Christ by physical ingestion. That is the dispute, not the extent of the atonement. Naturally we would expect Calvin's arguments to address the issue of Christ's bodily presence, not the irrelevant (to the dispute) issue of the extent of the atonement. This is further buttressed by the fact (as I pointed out previously) that Calvin held that Christ is given to unbelievers in the Lord's Supper.

Calvin's Irony

To begin the review of the passage containing the critical sentence (as promised above), note the irony Calvin used in addressing Heshusius and his arguments.

It is worth while to observe in passing, with what acuteness he disposes of my objection, that Christ cannot be separated from his Spirit. His answer is, that as the words of Paul are clear, he assents to them. Does he mean to astonish us by a miracle when he tells us that the blind see it?

"Blind" is one of the kindest adjectives Calvin used of Heshusius in the entire tract! In the very first line of the tract Calvin calls him "petulant, dishonest, rabid." Later in the very same first paragraph he addresses Heshusius's arguments as coming "from another sink." Further on, Calvin accuses him of seeking "fame by advancing paradoxes and absurd opinions." One could go on at further and more humorous lengths. Calvin certainly was not above making Heshusius the object of obloquy. (One wonders if Calvin were not inspired by the spirit of Luther in answering the Lutherans!)

Besides mocking Heshusius himself at every turn, Calvin shows Heshusius's doctrine in the most unfavorable light. At one point he says, "If Christ is in the bread, he should be worshipped under the bread." He compares Heshusius's doctrine of the Eucharist unfavorably to the Roman Catholic doctrine. Calvin says:

[Heshusius] vindicates himself and the churches of his party from the error of transubstantiation with which he falsely alleges that we charge them. For though they have many things in common with the Papists, we do not therefore confound them together and leave no distinction. I should rather say, it is long since I showed that the Papists in their dreams are considerably more modest and more sober.

Early on in the tract, Calvin engages Heshusius at some length on whether Christ's flesh is bitten by teeth. Calvin asks, "Why should he be so afraid of the touch of the palate or throat, while he ventures to assert that it is absorbed by the bowels?"

I point all of this out to show that in making his challenge to Heshusius regarding the wicked eating the flesh of Christ that was not sacrificed for them, Calvin intended to show Heshusius in the worst possible light. He was not engaging in irenic philosophical dispute. He was charging Heshusius with gross absurdities and inconsistencies. We should not be surprised at Calvin's calling up grotesque images and ideas in his criticism of Heshusius — the more grotesque the better, one imagines. What comic irony would there be in charging Heshusius with violating a principal that he did not hold?

I've exceeded a thousand words already, so I shall continue this next time. There's a lot more to go.

Technorati Tags: John Calvin, Calvinism, Reformed Theology, Limited Atonement, Unlimited Atonement, Heshusius

Calvin's View of the Atonement - Part V

No Citadel for Limited Atonement Here

I have been advancing reasons why Calvin's tract against Heshusius is not the bastion for the limited atonement advocates that they imagine it to be. The first two reasons relate to the context of Calvin's body of work as a whole and the tract against Heshusius in particular. Limited atonement is foreign to his teaching. Reasons three and four are logical arguments related to the wording of the famous limited atonement quote and the inapplicability of limited atonement to Calvin's argument against Heshusius.

Reasons five and six will be arguments from the context of the tract itself. Readers, bear with me; I promise this will be worth your while. Reason five today, and reason six next time.

Calvin's Theology of the Lord's Supper

The argument that Calvin had with Heshusius related almost exclusively to the Lutheran doctrine that Christ's body is present in the elements of the Eucharist. Any other differences (e.g., the ubiquity of Christ's body and whether unbelievers partake of Christ in the observance of the Supper) are directly related to that fundamental difference. Apart from this difference, Calvin and Heshusius have a great deal in common.

For example, Calvin believed that worthy partakers do indeed partake of Christ's body in the Eucharist.

[I]t is declared in my writings more than a hundred times, that so far am I from rejecting the term substance, that I ingenuously and readily declare, that by the incomprehensible agency of the Spirit, spiritual life is infused into us from the substance of the flesh of Christ. I also constantly admit that we are substantially fed on the flesh and blood of Christ....

Unbelievers who partake of the Lord's Supper are eating damnation to themselves.

It is indeed true, that contumely is offered to the flesh of Christ by those who with impious disdain and contempt reject it when it is held forth for food....

And later in the tract, speaking of the condemnation due to unbelievers who partake unworthily of the Lord's Supper, Calvin answers Heshusius as follows:

[A]s they impiously reject what is liberally offered to them, they are deservedly condemned for profane and brutish contempt, inasmuch as they set at nought that victim by which the sins of the world were expiated, and men reconciled to God.

It seems natural, then, for Calvin to hold that as unbelievers eat damnation to themselves in their unworthy eating, Christ's body is actually offered to them in the Supper.

[W]e maintain, that in the Supper Christ holds forth his body to reprobates as well as to believers...."

* * *

he is certainly offered in common to all, to unbelievers as well as to believers.

Indeed, Christ is given to unbelievers in the Supper.

He [Heshusius - slc] might have some color for this, if I denied that the body of Christ is given to the unworthy....

Emphasis added. All these quotes are taken from the Heshusius tract, and on all these points Heshusius and Calvin are in agreement. (These same sentiments can be found in the Institutes as well.) In the next blog post I will focus on the area of disagreement between the two men, but for now it is important to notice in summary, Calvin and Heshusius agree on this point, that Christ is offered — nay, given — to unbelievers in the Lord's Supper.

5) The Limited Atonement Argument Refutes Calvin's Theology of the Lord's Supper

Now let's consider the limited atonement advocate's strong point. Here is the Heshusius quote (isolated from its context):

I should like to know how the wicked can eat the flesh of Christ which was not crucified for them? and how they can drink the blood which was not shed to expiate their sins?

The idea is supposedly this: since Christ did not die for the wicked, how could they eat the flesh and drink the blood of Christ which was not crucified and shed for them? It isn't for them, so they can't partake of it.

But if Calvin is really using limited atonement to refute Heshusius's theology, then his victory is Pyrrhic, for his own theology is refuted at the same time. In using limited atonement, Calvin would be hoist by his own petard. A simple substitution shows the problem:

I should like to know how the wicked can be given the flesh of Christ which was not crucified for them? and how they can drink the blood which was not shed to expiate their sins?

I substituted the words be given for the word eat, which is what Calvin actually used. But Calvin holds that the flesh of Christ is given to unbelievers in the Eucharist. If Calvin were actually arguing from limited atonement, the very question that Calvin posed to Heshusius could be posed to Calvin himself. Limited atonement would defeat his own theology as well as that of Heshusius. Christ's flesh obviously could not be given to unbelievers if his flesh were not crucified for them. They could not be given his blood to drink if it were not shed for them. Calvin would never have missed such an obvious point as this. It seems clear to me that this is not at all what Calvin had in mind. Calvin is not arguing from limited atonement.

Then what does the quote mean? What is really going on here? In my next blog post I will propose an answer that I find supremely satisfying. It is based on the actual theology of Calvin and Heshusius, and the actual dispute between them. Full details next time.

Technorati Tags: john calvin, calvinism, reformed theology, limited atonement, unlimited atonement, Heshusius

Calvin's View of the Atonement - Part IV

Two more reasons why Heshusius doesn't work

For those who advocate the position that Calvin taught limited atonement, Calvin's tract against Heshusius is the strong bulwark. But it won't work. I promised five reasons in my previous essay on Heshusius, but I've now upped it to six. In today's blog entry I'll give you reasons three and four and reserve the rest for another entry — to be posted soon, I promise!

To review briefly, here is the statement that the whole reformed world knows of:

I should like to know how the wicked can eat the flesh of Christ which was not crucified for them? and how they can drink the blood which was not shed to expiate their sins?

Theological Treatises, 285. As I pointed out in my previous essay, this is out of context in two ways: it fails to take account of Calvin's theology as a whole and it fails to take account of Calvin's statements within the Heshusius tract. In both Calvin's corpus as a whole and the Heshusius tract in particular, Calvin teaches a universal aspect in Christ's atonement. For Calvin, Christ is "the life and salvation of the world." (Theological Treatises, 285.)

3) "Wicked" doesn't mean "non-elect"

Let's consider the well-known statement quoted above. Does Calvin say that he would like to know how the non-elect (or the reprobate) eat the flesh of Christ offered in the Lord's Supper? No. He asks how the wicked eat the flesh of Christ. Calvin does not here distinguish between elect and reprobate, but between believers and unbelievers. He distinguishes between believers and unbelievers, between worthy and unworthy partakers. There is no hint of Calvin's argument treating of the unworthiness of the non-elect. Rather Calvin argues of the unworthiness of unbelievers.

It will eventually (if someone cares to actually read the tract) be pointed out, of course, that the end of the same paragraph in which the famous quote is found contains a distinction between elect and reprobate:

When he afterwards says that the Holy Spirit dwelt in Saul, we must send him to his rudiments, that he may learn how to discriminate between the sanctification which is proper only to the elect and the children of God, and the general power which even the reprobate possess. These quibbles, therefore, do not in the slightest degree affect my axiom, that Christ, considered as the living bread and the victim immolated on the cross, cannot enter any human body which is devoid of his Spirit.

"Clearly," the limited atonement advocate will say, "Calvin has the distinction between elect and reprobate in his mind." Careless readers often will look simply for the proximity of words rather than a connection of meaning and argument. The words "elect" and "reprobate" appear on the same page, and all analysis is at an end. "Context," they will cry. They eagerly stamp their presuppositions (H.T. Tony) on any mention of right-sounding words regardless of grammar and reason.

But any sensible reader will see that Calvin speaks here of the difference between elect and reprobate with respect to the presence of the Holy Spirit, not with respect to participation in the spiritual benefits of the Lord's Supper. That such is the case is conclusively proved by the last part of the concluding sentence: "Christ, considered as the living bread and the victim immolated on the cross, cannot enter any human body which is devoid of his Spirit." The unbelieving (even if elect) have not Christ's Spirit and therefore cannot participate in the spiritual benefits of the Lord's Supper.

(I must credit my friend Tony for reminding me of this argument. Without his timely reminder, I might have let this point slip.)

4) The Limited Atonement Argument is Out of Place

The limited atonement advocates are representing Calvin as saying something like this: "since Christ has died only for the elect, I should like to know how the non-elect can spiritually participate in the Lord's Supper." But this argument would mean less than nothing to Heshusius.

As Curt Daniel points out, the introductory phrase, "I should like to know" is a flourish by Calvin indicating a rhetorical question. It poses a question for which Heshusius ought to give a satisfactory answer. Calvin is essentially demanding an accounting of Heshusius. Obviously then, Calvin is, by these words, introducing an argument based on principles espoused by Heshusius himself. If Calvin is arguing from a limited intention in the atonement to a limited spiritual partaking of the Lord's Supper, then the argument would be meaningless to Heshusius. Under the limited atonement presupposition, Heshusius would feel no obligation to answer.

Rather than feeling an obligation to answer, the argument would itself have provided a strong refuge for Heshusius. Since, as is conceded by all concerned, Heshusius did not hold to limited atonement, any argument against his darling doctrine of Christ's bodily presence in the bread and wine based on limited atonement, would have done more to confirm him in his belief than to move him from it. A limited atonement argument would have been like red meat to him. He would have attacked Calvin mercilessly on the point. We can imagine him saying, "Of course you have a defective view of Christ's presence in the Lord's Supper, for you have a defective view of Christ's work on the cross! Your corrupt doctrine of the atonement corrupts your view of the Supper."

I will go a step further. If — hypothetically speaking — Calvin were using limited atonement as an argument against Heshusius's view of the Supper, he would certainly have expounded on it fully. We would have more than just a passing reference in a rhetorical question (which is itself ironic in tone). No, the dispute would have been heated. Heshusius certainly would have goaded Calvin on the point (probably in strongly ironic language), which would have provoked Calvin to respond at length (and in kind). The fact that no such dispute appears in the tract — that limited atonement makes no appearance anywhere else in the dispute — itself indicates that this is not the basis on which Calvin makes his challenge. Calvin's real challenge will be suggested in a future (hopefully not too distant future) blog post.

Technorati Tags: john calvin, calvinism, reformed theology, limited atonement, unlimited atonement, heshusius

Calvin's View of the Atonement - Part III

Yeah, but what about Heshusius?

The final refuge for the limited atonement advocate — and the argument with the strongest appeal on the face of it — is the statement Calvin made in his treatise against Heshusius. Here is the statement:

But the first thing to be explained is, how Christ is present with unbelievers, as being the spiritual food of souls, and, in short, the life and salvation of the world. And as he adheres so doggedly to the words, I should like to know how the wicked can eat the flesh of Christ which was not crucified for them? and how they can drink the blood which was not shed to expiate their sins?

Theological Treatises, 285. (You can also find the tract against Heshusius online.) The person who insists that Calvin taught limited atonement sees vindication for their position in Calvin's questions: "I should like to know how the wicked can eat the flesh of Christ which was not crucified for them? and how they can drink the blood which was not shed to expiate their sins?" Clearly here, if nowhere else, Calvin is telling us that there are some men for whom Christ was not crucified.

Or perhaps not so clearly. The limited atonement advocates (by that I mean those who believe Calvin taught that Christ did not die for some men) see Calvin's question as rhetorically teaching that there are some men ... the wicked ... for whom Christ did not die. His flesh was "not crucified for them" and his blood "not shed to expiate their sins." But the question is not as simple as it is normally presented. I will list five reasons why I reject this interpretation of Calvin's comments.

1) The Context of Calvin's Work

First, the comment is out of keeping with Calvin's theology. As far as I know, this comment is not repeated in any other place in Calvin's corpus. In fact, Calvin contradicts this idea in many places. For example:

Wherever the faithful are dispersed throughout the world, John extends to them the expiation wrought by Christ’s death. But this does not alter the fact that the reprobate are mixed up with the elect in the world. It is incontestable that Christ came for the expiation of the sins of the world. But the solution lies close at hand, that whosoever believes in Him should not perish but should have eternal life (Jn 3:15). For the present question is not how great the power of Christ is or what efficacy it has in itself, but to whom he gives Himself to be enjoyed. If possession lies in faith and faith emanates from the Spirit of adoption, it follows that only he is reckoned in the number of God’s children who will be partakers of Christ. The evangelist John sets forth the office of Christ as nothing else than by His death to gather the children of God into one (Jn 11:52). Hence we conclude that the reconciliation is offered to all through Him, yet the benefit is peculiar to the elect, that they may be gathered into the society of life.

Calvin, The Eternal Predestination of God, p., 148-9.

According to this quote from Calvin, Christ came for the expiation of the sins of the world, a world that has the elect and the reprobate mixed up together in it. And this reconciliation is offered to all, though benefitting only the elect. This idea runs throughout Calvin's theology and throughout his works. Thus for Calvin to say seriously in response to Heshusius that Christ was not crucified for the wicked is a rather fantastic idea and quite out of keeping.

2) The Immediate Context

My second reason for rejecting this interpretation of Calvin's words is that it is out of keeping with what Calvin said in the tract against Heshusius itself. Consider this statement:

Still he insists, and exclaims that nothing can be clearer than the declaration, that the wicked do not discern the Lord’s body, and that darkness is violently and intentionally thrown on the clearest truth by all who refuse to admit that the body of Christ is taken by the unworthy.

He might have some color for this, if I denied that the body of Christ is given to the unworthy; but as they impiously reject what is liberally offered to them, they are deservedly condemned for profane and brutish contempt, inasmuch as they set at nought that victim by which the sins of the world were expiated, and men reconciled to God.

That is, Calvin admits that in the Lord's Supper Christ is given to the unworthy, and asserts that these unbelievers are justly condemned for rejecting Christ's sacrifice for them. Some limited atonement advocates will balk at this and insist that by "world" here Calvin does not mean every man. But there is no reason to suppose this. The immediate context makes this reference quite clear.

The next post will have reasons 3) and 4).

Technorati Tags: john calvin, calvinism, reformed theology, limited atonement, unlimited atonement, heshusius

Calvin's View of the Atonement - Part II

What about 1John 2:2?

1John 2:2 KJV And he is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world.

One of Calvin's statements that is most relied upon in proving that Calvin did teach limited atonement is his comment on 1John 2:2. Here is Calvin's comment in its entirety from Christian Classics Ethereal Library:

And not for ours only. He added this for the sake of amplifying, in order that the faithful might be assured that the expiation made by Christ, extends to all who by faith embrace the gospel.

Here a question may be raised, how have the sins of the whole world been expiated? I pass by the dotages of the fanatics, who under this pretense extend salvation to all the reprobate, and therefore to Satan himself. Such a monstrous thing deserves no refutation. They who seek to avoid this absurdity, have said that Christ suffered sufficiently for the whole world, but efficiently only for the elect. This solution has commonly prevailed in the schools. Though then I allow that what has been said is true, yet I deny that it is suitable to this passage; for the design of John was no other than to make this benefit common to the whole Church. Then under the word all or whole, he does not include the reprobate, but designates those who should believe as well as those who were then scattered through various parts of the world. For then is really made evident, as it is meet, the grace of Christ, when it is declared to be the only true salvation of the world.

This quote is used primarily because it does speak directly to the issue of the extent of the atonement and Calvin does give a "Calvinistic" interpretation of the scripture. It includes the crucial words, "he does not include the reprobate...." Here, if nowhere else, Calvin is clearly being Calvin, and this gives the limited atonement advocates some comfort and support.

The problem with this quotation from Calvin is that an honest reading reveals that it does not support the limited atonement position. This will be seen on a careful analysis of his argument.

Analysis of Calvin's argument

First, Calvin asks how it could be that Christ is really the propitiation for the whole world. Could salvation extend to all the reprobate and to Satan himself? Calvin rightly recoils from such a monstrosity and gives two alternatives — two ways of understanding the passage without admitting the absurdity of universal salvation.

The first way — which Calvin rejects as unsuitable to the passage — is the distinction commonly made by the schoolmen, that Christ suffered sufficiently for all men and efficiently only for the elect. But it is important to note that though Calvin denies that this distinction is suitable to the passage, he does not deny the truth of the distinction. In fact, he admits the distinction to be a good one. He says, "Though then I allow that what has been said is true, yet I deny that it is suitable to this passage...." The distinction is true — Christ died sufficiently for all and efficiently for the elect — but the distinction does not apply to this passage.

We might — properly — consider Calvin's pronouncement on this point to be an obiter dictum: an opinion not necessary to the main argument. But even so, this statement runs directly counter to the idea that Calvin taught limited atonement.

The second way of understanding 1John 2:2, according to Calvin, is to see Christ's propitiation as extending to the church scattered throughout the world. Calvin held that this understanding was the true meaning of the apostle. But we must not allow ourselves to be carried away here. Though Calvin says that this verse ought to be understood as not referring to the reprobate, that does not mean that Calvin thought that Christ's propitiation has no reference to the reprobate at all. Calvin does not say here — indeed he never says in all of his corpus — that Christ's work has no reference to the reprobate. If that is what is meant by "limited atonement," then Calvin did not teach it.

So the problems for the limited atonement advocates in reference to this comment are twofold: there is nothing here that teaches limited atonement, and there is a statement — obiter dictum though it might be — that runs directly counter to their thesis.

Use of Calvin's 1John 2:2 comment

In James White's Dividing Line program, which I referred to in my previous post on this subject, White addressed the 1John 2:2 comment. As part of his comment on this point (which consisted mainly of criticism of Geisler's use of the comment in his book critiquing Calvinism) White said,

What [Calvin] denied the particular passage could be used to teach was the distinction the schoolmen made; he himself says that John is not including the reprobate in this statement.

What White says is true as far as it goes. Calvin did indeed deny that the passage teaches the distinction of the schoolmen. But to be strictly honest, one must also admit that Calvin admitted the truth of the distinction. This alone destroys the limited atonement thesis. And White is further correct that Calvin says that John does not refer to the reprobate. But honesty again requires the admission that this does not mean that Calvin believed that Christ's work has no reference to the reprobate. Calvin's opinion is limited to the teaching of 1John 2:2; he does not extend himself here to a systematic theology of the atonement.

I end with a quote from Calvin (one of many) that pulls the legs out from under the limited atonement advocate.

For the faithless have no profit at all by the death and passion of our Lord Jesus Christ, but rather are so much the more damnable, because they reject the mean that God had ordained: and their unthankfulness shall be so much the more grievously punished, because they have trodden under foot the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, which was the ransom for their souls.

Calvin, Sermons on Galatians 1:3-5, Golding translation. Does the limited atonement advocate say, with Calvin, that Jesus Christ is the ransom for the souls of the faithless?

Technorati Tags: john calvin, unlimited atonement, limited atonement, theology

Calvin's View of the Atonement - Part I

Did Calvin teach Limited Atonement?

This is the central question of the "Calvin v. the Calvinists" dispute. Though this has been primarily the province of Calvin scholars and experts, it strikes me as well within the capacity of lay readers of Calvin. The Christian of ordinary intelligence can decide the question for himself. The question is fairly simple because of the paucity of evidence on one side of the question and the abundance of evidence on the other. The only significant question, in my view, is how this dispute could have been carried on for so long when the evidence speaks so powerfully for itself.

The answer to the question is that Calvin did not teach Limited Atonement — at least not the version of limited atonement that is popular in reformed circles today. This can be demonstrated fairly simply by looking at the evidence given in favor of the limited atonement side. The evidence is slim.

As an example of the modern reformed attitude toward the question, I'll use a James White "Dividing Line" program from July 10, 1999. White had as his guest a fellow-pastor from Phoenix, Pastor Jeff Niell. Niell has done some study on the Calvin v. the Calvinists question and has some definite opinions.

The question, as defined by White on this program, was stated by Norm Geisler in his book, Chosen but Free.

[Calvin] certainly denied Limited Atonement as they understand it. For Calvin the atonement is universal in extent and limited only in its application, namely to those who believe.

Page 106.

This impresses me as at least a roughly accurate statement of Calvin's theology of the atonement. (This was certainly the understanding of W.G.T. Shedd and R.L. Dabney.) According to White and Niell, the evidence is clear and unambiguous on the other side of the question — in favor of Calvin's having taught limited atonement. In the next several blog posts, I will deal with the main evidence given for Calvin's supposed affirmation of Limited Atonement.

What is the evidence?

The first category of evidence is the strong predestinarianism present throughout Calvin's writings. In White's interview, Niell used a selection of quotations from Calvin on subjects other than but related to the atonement. Niell rattles off several quotes from Calvin that affirm this strong predestinarianism. First, from Calvin's Commentary on John 17:2:

Jesus asks nothing but what is agreeable to the will of the Father. * * * Christ does not say that he has been made governor over the whole world in order to ... bestow life on all without distinction, but he limits this grace to those who have been given him.

Next, Niell uses two quotes quote from the Institutes in which Calvin proves the doctrine of predestination from the scriptures:

[t]he whole world does not belong to its creator except that grace rescues from God's curse and wrath and eternal death a limited number, who would otherwise perish.

* * *

this we must believe, when he declares that he knows whom he has chosen, he denotes in the human genus a particular species distinguished not by the quality of its virtues but by heavenly decree.

Institutes 3.22.7. And finally a quote from Institutes 3.22.10:

hence it is clear that the doctrine of salvation ... is falsely debased when presented as effectually profitable to all.

Though these quotations might seem impressive at first glance, none of them touch directly on the question of the extent of the atonement. The question in debate is not Calvin's view of election, rather it is Calvin's view of the intent and extent of the atonement. Thus the quotes are inapt. Niell's first quote, from John 17:2, speaks of Christ's rule, not of his atonement. (Even here there is a suggestion of the universality mixed with particularity, for Calvin says later in the same paragraph, "So then, the kingdom of Christ extends, no doubt, to all men; but it brings salvation to none but the elect....")

Niell's second and third quotations, both from Institutes 3.22.7, speak of a scriptural proof of the doctrine of predestination. This is not in dispute. And the final quote from Institutes 3.22.10 relates to Calvin's reconciliation of the universal call with particular grace. Again, this point is not in dispute. Though it is interesting that again Calvin shows the general call coinciding with the special intent of God to save the elect. The sentence following Niell's quotation is this: "For the present let it suffice to observe, that though the word of the gospel is addressed generally to all, yet the gift of faith is rare. "

One might be inclined to rescue Niell's argument by asserting that the elements of T.U.L.I.P. stand or fall together — that to deny one is to deny them all. If this were the case, then Calvin's strong predestinarianism necessarily implies limited atonement. But I have already shown that such is not the case.

Further, Calvin so often taught the universality of Christ's atonement in such strong language, that the "stands or falls together" argument becomes moot unless one wishes to press the complete irrationality of Calvin's system. Here, for example, is an excerpt from Calvin's comment on Romans 5:18:

He makes this favor common to all, because it is propounded to all, and not because it is in reality extended to all; for though Christ suffered for the sins of the whole world, and is offered through God's benignity indiscriminately to all, yet all do not receive him.

No lack of clarity there. And this is only one quote of many to this effect. Stay tuned; I'll show you more.

Venn Diagrams - Part IV

For the last essay in this series, I want to take a couple of real life examples and analyze them using Venn diagrams. If you stumble across this in the backwaters of the internet and have a question about logic or Venn diagrams, please feel free to add a comment.

My friend Terry West complains about an argument for believer's baptism. He writes,

Premise 1. Believers are to be baptized.
Premise 2. Infants cannot believe.
Conclusion 3. Therefore Infants cannot be baptized.

Now, as has been stated several times and in several ways in the last two articles, the most glaring fallacy is that the subject of premise one and two are not the same, therefore what is true of the subject of premise one cannot be said to be untrue of the subject of premise two.

We can analyze the argument using Venn diagrams and not worry about a verbal justification for any objections. The terms are Believers, Baptized, and Infants. Obviously we need three circles to represent these terms.

And if we take the first premise as All Believers are to be baptized, then we must shade out the part of the Believers circle that falls outside the Baptized circle. The shading represents emptiness, so the diagram below means that there are not any believers who are not baptized.

The second premise says that infants are not believers, so we shade all of the Infants circle that falls within the Believers circle. This will show that all the infants are not believers.

Looking at the results in the above diagram, we see that part of the Infants circle that falls within the Baptism circle remains unshaded. Thus the conclusion, Infants cannot be baptized is unsupported.

But we want to rethink this argument a bit. Obviously the first premise, "all believers are baptized" is untrue. The thief on the cross is an example, or Abraham. The dispute is about who is properly to be baptized, so we should say "all believers are properly to be baptized." But really, this doesn't get at the force of the argument, so we should really put the major premise this way: only Believers are Properly Baptized.

Or, more correctly: All Properly Baptized Persons are Believers So now the argument will look like this:

All Properly Baptized Persons are Believers;
no Infants are Believers;
therefore no Infants are Properly Baptized Persons.

The major premise of this argument would look like this when diagramed:

This first diagram shows that all properly baptized persons are believers. Now we add shading to represent the minor premise, which is, "no infants are belivers."

With the argument revised like this, the conclusion "no infants are properly baptized persons" is valid. If the premises are true, then the conclusion is certainly established.

Terry West objects that this is circular reasoning. The syllogism itself is not circular. But the argument does assume the truth of the major premise, "all properly baptized persons are believers." If that premise is put in dispute, (or the minor premise, for that matter) then it is, of course, incumbent on the arguer for believers' baptism to support that premise. Terry would object that the major premise is perhaps untrue and unsupported. But considering this question is taking us beyond the use of Venn diagrams into the question of Christian baptism. (I remain a credo-baptist, by the way.) I just wanted to look at the diagrams to show how they would be drawn with a slightly different argument. The exercise is also useful to show that one must be very careful in defining the terms for the syllogism and constructing the premises accurately. The diagrams themselves are extremely useful in analyzing and justifying critiques of categorical syllogisms.

Technorati Tags: logic, theology, baptism, venn diagrams

Venn Diagrams - Part III

The standard categorical syllogism has three categorical statements or propositions: two premises — major and minor — and a conclusion. These three statements contain three terms. In the examples in the previous essay in this series, oranges, citrus fruit, apples, basketball players, people over 7 feet tall, F, and G are all terms. In a standard categorical syllogism, each term occurs in exactly two of the statements.

As an exercise, identify the terms in this syllogistic argument:

All citrus fruit is acidic,

All oranges are citrus fruit;

Therefore all oranges are acidic.

The terms are citrus fruit, acidic, and oranges. Notice that each of the terms occur in two of the statements: citrus fruit occurs in the major premise and the minor premise; acidic occurs in the major premise and the conclusion, and oranges occurs in the minor premise and the conclusion.

In a Venn diagram, the circles represent the terms (i.e., in the above argument, citrus fruit, acidic, and oranges) of the syllogistic argument. So, to diagram the citrus fruit argument, we need three circles, as follows:

The first statement says citrus fruit is acidic. As we saw in part II, in order to represent this in the diagram, we shade — remember, shading represents emptiness — the part of the citrus fruit circle that falls outside the acidic circle, thereby showing that there is no citrus fruit that is not acidic.

The second statement, oranges are citrus fruit, is shown in a similar way; we shade all of the area of the oranges circle that falls outside the citrus fruit circle.

All we need to do now is examine the diagram to see what conclusions are supported. At a glance we can see that all of the oranges circle that is not empty (not shaded) falls within the acidic things circle, and thus the conclusion all oranges are acidic is proved by the premises.

In the next installment, I will use an example from a dispute about Christian baptism to demonstrate how to spot a bad argument using Venn diagrams.

Venn Diagrams - Part II

This brief essay, the second in my series on Venn diagrams, is based on the work of W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic, 4th ed., and Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 10th ed. A categorical syllogism, in its classic form, contains three categorical statements (Quine) or propositions (Copi & Cohen). Two such statements constitute the premises -- a major premise and a minor premise -- and the third constitutes the conclusion.

A premise or conclusion will be in one of four forms: A (all F is G), I (some F is G), E (no F is G), or O (some F is not G). The traditional logical system built up labels for these premises with rules for proper inference, i.e. methods for constructing and evaluating arguments. The labels and rules may impress one as arcane and tedious, while Venn diagrams are simpler, much less tedious, and more enlightening. Venn diagrams do have their limits, but for most simple arguments they are a thing of beauty.

To represent the four types of categorical statements using Venn diagrams, we need two circles. The following statement is an A statement:

All oranges are citrus fruit.

We need a circle for oranges and another intersecting circle for citrus fruit. Like so:

To show that all oranges are citrus fruit, we need to shade the part of the oranges circle that falls outside the citrus fruit circle.

Remember from part I of this series that shading represents emptiness. So the diagram above shows that there are no oranges that are not citrus fruit. That is, the area of the oranges circle that falls outside the citrus fruit circle is empty. (As an interesting aside, the shape that is shaded in the above diagram was called a lune by Quine.)

Let's diagram a different kind of statement:

No apples are citrus fruit.

This is an E statement: No F is G. It is diagramed as follows:

The shape that we shaded here (Quine called the shape a lens) shows that the area of overlap between the apples circle and the citrus fruit circle is empty. That is, there are no apples that are citrus fruit (and, conversely, no citrus fruit are apples). The Venn diagram shows this relationship beautifully and automatically shows us the valid inference no citrus fruit are apples.

The third type of statement is the I statement: some F is G. A typical statement might be some basketball players are over 7 feet tall. For this statement, we would put a cross in the lens between the circle representing basketball players and the circle representing people over 7 feet tall.

The cross shows us that there is at least one basketball player who is over 7 feet tall. And we can automatically see the converse, that at least one person who is over 7 feet tall is a basketball player.

Finally, the O statement, some F is not G is represented by the following diagram:

Notice that we put the cross in the lune of the F circle to show that there is at least one F that is not also a G. A typical statement of this type might be some basketball players are not over 7 feet tall.

The next part in this series will show how a full categorical syllogism can be diagramed.

Venn Diagrams - Part I

I profess to be examining the logic of the theology of John Calvin. In order to do that, we have to have some ideas about logic itself and we have to have tools for analyzing logic. One common form of argumentation is Aristotelian or categorical syllogisms. Categorical syllogisms are those syllogisms that have a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. The famous one runs like this:

All men are mortal;

Socrates is a man;

Therefore Socrates is mortal.

In my opinion, one of the best and simplest ways to analyze categorical syllogisms is Venn diagrams. They make the analysis simple and are also wonderful for making a visual presentation of one's analysis. Other techniques are required for more complicated arguments. But even complicated arguments can often be broken down into a series of simple syllogisms that are susceptible to analysis by Venn diagrams.

I thought I would put together a couple of short essays on the use of Venn diagrams. The material here is based on W. V. O. Quine, Methods of Logic, and Copi Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 10th edition.

In Venn diagrams, shading represents emptiness. So to represent "there are no unicorns," we would make a diagram like this:

A cross in a circle means "there is one or more." So to represent "there is at least one unicorn," we would make a diagram like this:

What does an empty circle mean? In modern logic, an empty circle means a lack of information. So the following diagram means, "there are zero or more unicorns."

More to follow in the next essay.

Criticism of Zanchius on Romans 8:32 in 500 words or less

I know that technical logic can be oppressive. So I'm going to make a brief summary of the objections I posted in my previous blog posts on Zanchius's misuse of logic and his error on Romans 8:32 in particular.

Zanchius made this comment about Romans 8:32:

In the same chapter Paul asks, "He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all [i.e., for all us elect persons], how shall He not, with Him, also freely give us all things?" i.e., salvation and all things necessary to it. Now, it is certain that these are not given to every individual, and yet, if Paul says true, they are given to all those for whom Christ was delivered to death; consequently He was not delivered to death for every individual.

In this paragraph, Zanchius makes the following two-step argument:

Argument 1:
Major premise: All elect are regenerated
Minor premise: All elect are died-for (here "died-for" means those atoned-for, those for whom Christ was delivered to death, the redeemed, however you wish to express that concept);
Conclusion: All died-for are regenerated.

Argument 2:
Major premise: All died-for are regenerated (this is the conclusion of argument 1)
Minor premise: Some men are not regenerated;
Conclusion: Therefore some men are not died-for.

(See "Zanchius: Logic gone awry - Part II" to see how I arrived at these statements of Zanchius's argument and a more complete analysis of the logic involved.)

Argument 2 is valid and powerful. But the whole two-step argument (which includes both Argument 1 and Argument 2) is unsound because of a fallacy in Argument 1. The fallacy is called illicit process. Look at argument 1 again. He has said nothing about all "died-for" in the premises, but then, in the conclusion, says something about all "died-for." This violates the laws of categorical syllogisms.

If you do the following exercise, it will help you see Zanchius's error. (Use a pencil and paper.) In Argument 1 above, substitute "bananas" for "elect," "yellow things" for "regenerated," and "sweet things" for "died-for." Funny, isn't it?

Here's another illustration:

Major premise: All snow is cold;
Minor premise: all snow is white
Conclusion: therefore all white things are cold

You can make all manner of similar silly arguments using Zanchius's flawed logic.

I draw two conclusions from this. First, Zanchius's argument on Romans 8:32 does not work to prove that Christ did not die for some men. I do not believe there is another verse in the Bible that can even remotely be used to prove that Christ did not die for some men.

Second, Zanchius has proven himself to be untrustworthy in his use of logic. From now on, whenever I read Zanchius, he will have to prove himself to me. Zanchius's logic is on probation.

Zanchius: Logic gone awry - Part II

Immanual Kant said, "Fallacious and misleading arguments are most easily detected if set out in correct syllogistic form." [Quoted in Copi and Cohen, "Introduction to Logic," 10th ed., p. 256.]

Kant was certainly correct, and it is just this procedure that I hope to apply to the argument of Zanchius in respect of Romans 8:32. In part I, I made a critique of the logic of Jerome Zanchius in the argument he used to reach the conclusion that Christ did not die for every man. He committed a fairly egregious error in logic, which shows that he was capable of making such errors. I say that to prepare the reader's mind to accept that Zanchius might have made a similar error in his analysis of Romans 8:32. Some readers will be strongly tempted to try to rehabilitate Zanchius as if his logic were not really flawed — as if it were all just a big misunderstanding. No; Zanchius could — and did — commit logical errors of the most obvious kind.

Here is Zanchius's comment on Romans 8:32 (which is in the paragraph following the paragraphs I criticized in part I:

In the same chapter Paul asks, "He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all [i.e., for all us elect persons], how shall He not, with Him, also freely give us all things?" i.e., salvation and all things necessary to it. Now, it is certain that these are not given to every individual, and yet, if Paul says true, they are given to all those for whom Christ was delivered to death; consequently He was not delivered to death for every individual.

This is a two-step argument, consisting of two categorical syllogisms. The second argument is a good and powerful one, and I'll set it out first.

All died-for are regenerated,
Some men are not regenerated;
Therefore some men are not died-for.

I use the term "died-for" as a short way of expressing "those for whom Christ died." I use the term "regenerated" as referring to those men who are given salvation and all things necessary to it — who one day come to faith. This is a valid argument, and if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true. I suspect many have been convinced of the truth of limited atonement by this argument. We can analyze this argument using Venn diagrams. The major premise looks like this:

We add a cross to the diagram to represent the minor premise, "some men are not regenerated."

The cross must go somewhere outside the "regenerated" circle (as required by the minor premise) and somewhere outside the "died-for" circle as required by the major premise (the major premise shaded out as empty all the area within the "died-for" circle that is outside the "regenerated" circle). The only place the cross can be placed is in an area that indicates that there are some men (at least one man) who is outside the "died-for" circle, and thus Zanchius's syllogism is confirmed. There is at least one man (probably Judas — and many more beside) who is not died-for.

The conclusion follows ineluctably from the premises. Where does Zanchius get these premises from? The minor premise is universally believed to be true — at least by conservative Christians. But what of the major premise? That premise comes from the first argument in the two-step chain of argumentation.

This premise is contained in the clause, "and yet, if Paul says true, they are given to all those for whom Christ was delivered to death...." The word "if" indicates to us that Zanchius has reached this conclusion as the result of a previous argument. (If such and such is true, then such and such proposition follows.) Zanchius claims to get the proposition from the apostle. But since the verse does not contain this proposition explicitly, it must come as the result of an argument.

So what is this step-one argument? Here it is, taken from Zanchius's paragraph, paraphrased and set down in syllogistic form:

All elect are died-for,
all elect are regenerated;
therefore, all died-for are regenerated.

Before we turn to the Venn diagram, let's confirm that we have represented Zanchius accurately. The first premise (it is actually the minor premise) says "all elect are died-for." This comes from Zanchius's statement, "He that spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all [i.e., for all us elect persons]...." To paraphrase, Christ was delivered up for all us elect persons. Or — even shorter — all elect are died-for.

The second (major) premise comes from Zanchius's statement, ""how shall He not, with Him, also freely give us all things?" i.e., salvation and all things necessary to it." As a paraphrase we could say, "He will regenerate all elect," or "all elect are regenerated," which is our minor premise.

As one last minor housekeeping matter, we should reverse the order of the first and second premises to put the major premise first. (The major premise contains the predicate of the conclusion.) So the final form of the argument is:

All elect are regenerated,
all elect are died-for;
therefore, all died-for are regenerated.

Let's look at the Venn diagram. The major premise, "all elect are regenerated looks like this:

Now we add the minor premise, "all elect are died-for:"

We are left with a diagram showing that all the elect are both died-for and regenerated. But look at that diagram. Somehow Zanchius arrives at the conclusion from this argument that all died-for are regenerated. How does he do that? Look at that big old space of died-for folks who are outside of the elect and regenerated circles. Zanchius's argument is a complete flop — again.

Argument 1 being a big flop, argument 2 (which was sound up til now) becomes a big flop as well. Even if we interpret Romans 8:32 in the way Zanchius wants us to, the logic doesn't work out favorably for his argument.

As before, we've seen the diagrams, but it is also useful to consider a parallel argument to illustrate the fallacy. So here is a parallel argument:

All bananas are yellow,
all bananas are sweet,
therefore, all sweet things are yellow.

As ridiculous as that looks, it is the very argument Zanchius used as the first step of his two-step argument. The only difference is in the terms used. Just to round things off, let's illustrate the valid step-two argument:

All sweet things are yellow,
Some candy is not yellow;
therefor some candy is not sweet.

The step-two argument is perfectly valid; the problem lies in the false major premise that was taken from the conclusion of the fallacious step-one argument.

Technorati Tags: Calvinism, John Calvin, limited atonement, unlimited atonement, Zanchius, Romans 8:32

Zanchius: Logic gone awry - Part I

I have criticized, previously and in another forum, Jerome Zanchius's treatment of Romans 8:32. I was going to brush up the criticism in order to publish it here. In researching the article, I found that Zanchius's logic is worse than my first impression told me, so I decided to make this a two-part article.

I refer to Zanchius's argument in chapter 2 (entitled "The Will of God") in his work, "Observations on the Divine Attributes." In Position 9, he says this:

As God doth not will that each individual of mankind should be saved, so neither did He will that Christ should properly and immediately die for each individual of mankind, whence it follows that, though the blood of Christ, from its own intrinsic dignity, was sufficient for the redemption of all men, yet, in consequence of His Father's appointment, He shed it intentionally, and therefore effectually and immediately, for the elect only.

This is self-evident. God, as we have before proved, wills not the salvation of every man, but He gave His Son to die for them whose salvation He willed; therefore His Son did not die for every man.

The argument (contained in the second paragraph, which is intended to prove the assertions contained in the first paragraph) is a syllogism and can be set out as follows:

All willed-for are died-for;
Some men are not willed-for,
therefore, some men are not died-for.

Here "willed-for" means "those men whom God wills the salvation of." "Died-for" means "those who God gave His Son to die for." I switched the order of Zanchius's first and second premises in order to put the major premise first. It looks strong, but it's a fallacy. We can see this if we set out the argument using Venn diagrams.

The major premise, "all willed-for are died-for," looks like this:

The part of the circle representing the willed-for that is not also part of the died-for circle is shaded out to represent that it is empty. That is, there are no willed-for who are not died-for.

To show the minor premise, "some men are not willed-for," we will put a cross in the men circle but outside the willed-for circle. The cross means that there is at least one man whom God has not willed to save. But notice that we have a couple of choices. We can put the cross either inside our outside the died-for circle. We can legitimately put the cross within the intersection of the men and died-for circles because that part of the circle has not been shaded. It would look like this:

The diagram shows a cross in the section of the diagram that represents men who are died-for, but are not willed-for. This diagram demonstrates that Zanchius's argument does not prove what he wants it to prove. In order for Zanchius's argument to be confirmed, the cross would have to be placed in the section of the men circle that lies outside the died-for circle, and this placement would have to be required by the terms of the major premise. The diagram would have to look like this:

The diagrams show the fallacy. But we can also see the fallacy by making a parallel argument using more familiar terms. Examine this precisely parallel argument:

Some brain surgeons, as we have before proved, are not geniuses, but a high IQ is possessed by all geniuses; therefore a high IQ is not possessed by every brain surgeon.

Hopefully you can see how bad this reasoning is. And Zanchius's argument is just as bad.

The Incongruity of Unlimited Atonement - Part II

If there is an incongruity in the idea of unlimited atonement, it cannot be rooted in a conflict between the members of the Trinity but in an incongruity between election, particular redemption, and the effectual call on the one hand and general love, universal atonement, and the free offer of the gospel on the other. There is no conflict between the members of the Holy Trinity, but an apparent conflict within God's plan.

The conflict exists between two manifestations of God's will: God's will of decree as opposed to God's revealed will. That such a tension exists between God's decretive will and His revealed will is obvious from many passages of scripture. When Jesus taught us to pray "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," he implicitly taught us that God's revealed will does not always come to pass despite God's desire that it should come to pass. Or take the occasion of Jesus' lamentation over Jerusalem. He said, "how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!" (Matthew 23:37.) Here Jesus strongly expressed the revealed will of God, which God did not see fit to bring about through His will of decree. I believe the conflict is also seen in Christ's prayer in Gethsemane. (I am unwilling to consign Jesus' cry for deliverance to his human nature only.)

To return to the pressing question for unlimited atonement, how could it be that God could love a sinner -- love him enough to send His only Son to die for that sinner -- and yet consign him to eternal damnation without mercy? One must, of course, appeal to mystery at this point. R. L. Dabney writing on this question urges us to modesty in analyzing the infinite mind:

Let one take this set of facts. Here is a company of sinners; God could convert all by the same powers by which He converts one. He offers His salvation to all and assures them of His general benevolence. He knows perfectly that some will neglect the offer; and yet, so knowing, He intentionally refrains from exerting those powers, to overrule their reluctance, which He is able to exert if He chose. This is but a statement of stubborn facts; it cannot be evaded without impugning the omniscience, or omnipotence of God, or both. Yet, see if the whole difficulty is not involved in it. Every evangelical Christian, therefore, is just as much interested in seeking the solution of this difficulty as the Calvinist. And it is to be sought in the following brief suggestions. God's concern in the transgression and impenitence of those whom He suffers to neglect His warnings and invitations, is only permissive. He merely leaves men to their own sinful choice. His invitations are always impliedly, or explicitly conditional; suspended on the sinner's turning. He has never said that He desires the salvation of a sinner as impenitent; He only says, if the sinner will turn, he is welcome to salvation. And this is always literally true; were it in the line of possibilities that one non-elect should turn, he would find it true in his case. All, therefore, that we have to reconcile is these three facts; that God should see a reason why it is not proper, in certain cases, to put forth His almighty grace to overcome a sinner's reluctance; and yet that He should be able to do it if He chose; and yet should be benevolent and pitiful towards all His creatures. Now God says in His Word that He does compassionate lost sinners. He says that He could save if He pleased. His word and providence both show us that some are permitted to be lost. In a wise and good man, we can easily understand how a power to pardon, a sincere compassion for a guilty criminal, and yet a fixed purpose to punish, could co-exist; the power and compassion being overruled by His wisdom. Why may not something analogous take place in God, according to His immutable nature? Is it said: such an explanation implies a struggle in the breast between competing considerations, inconsistent with God's calm blessedness? I reply, God's revelations of His wrath, love, pity, repentance, &c., are all anthropopathic, and the difficulty is no greater here, than in all these cases. Or is it said, that there can be nothing except a lack of will, or a lack of power to make the sinner both holy and happy? I answer: it is exceeding presumption to suppose that, because we do not see such a cause, none can be known to God!

Robert L. Dabney, Systematic Theology, pages 245-246. The modest position is to allow mystery where scripture speaks clearly and logic fails us.

Technorati Tags: unlimited atonement, limited atonement, dabney, calvinism

The Incongruity of Unlimited Atonement

While I hold to a version of Limited Atonement, I also hold to a version of Unlimited Atonement. As I mentioned in my first blog entry, I hold to unlimited atonement (as defined by W. G. T. Shedd,) and limited atonement (as defined by R. L. Dabney). The difference between these two theologians is partly in their definitions of "atonement." When Dabney used the term, he meant actual reconciliation, while Shedd used the term in the way that most modern Calvinists would. Despite the difference in definition, they both believed that Christ's work was for everyone without distinction. The limitation in the atonement is in the application, which is for the elect alone -- by grace through faith.

So I am a five-point Calvinist of a sort. My previous blog entry, though, was in defense of four-point Calvinism. I mentioned there that four-point Calvinism is not logically inconsistent, B. B. Warfield to the contrary notwithstanding.

There is nothing illogical here provided we keep in mind the distinction between provision on the one hand and application on the other (borrowing Dr. Kevin Bauder's terms [scroll down to find the article entitled "The Logic of Limited Atonement"]). We could better use the terms Dabney and Shedd used. They taught the same concept by distinguishing between expiation and atonement -- as per Dabney -- or between atonement and redemption -- as per Shedd.

There does seem to be something wrong with the scheme, though. Here is the problem: If we understand the eternal counsel of God properly, the Father elected certain ones to be given to the Son as his people. Thus the saving and efficacious love of the Father is bestowed on the elect alone. If we view Christ's work on the cross as being universal, then the Son died for all men, regardless of the particular love of the Father for the elect. So the Father's work in salvation is limited and particular, while the Son's work in salvation is unlimited and general. Though there may be nothing illogical about this in the strict sense, there certainly does seem to be something incongruous about it. Why would the Son do a work of sacrifice that is seemingly so out of step with the particularity of the decree of election?

The incongruity is really only a misunderstanding. If we think of God as having both a general will that all men be saved and a special will that the elect be saved (1Timothy 4:10), then we must think of each member of the Holy Trinity as agreeing with such a purpose and contributing to that purpose.

Thus, the Father loves the world in general and has a special love for the elect (compare Matthew 5:44-45, John 3:16, John 6:32, Romans 2:4, and 1John 4:14 with Ephesians 1:4 and cognates). The Son gave his life for the world and especially those that believe (compare John 3:16, John 12:47, and 1John 2:2, with Ephesians 5:25 and 1Timothy 4:10). The Holy Spirit draws all men generally, and the elect efficaciously (compare Revelation 22:17 with 2Thessalonians 2:13).

Thus there is no conflict between a general work of Christ on the one hand and a particular electing decree of the Father and the effectual call of the Holy Spirit on the other hand. Rather, there is a general love of God for all men and a saving purpose concordant with that love in which every member of the Holy Trinity participates. And there is a particular love of God for His elect people with an efficacious saving purpose concordant with that love in which every member of the Holy Trinity also participates.

More on this in the next blog entry.

Logic, Four Point Calvinism, and Undoing Amyraldianism

We Calvinists consider ourselves to be students of the Bible, of theology, and -- not incidentally -- of logic. If many of us are not students of logic as a formal discipline, we at least find ourselves drawn to logic and resorting to logic in our interpretation of scripture and in our apologetic for the Calvinistic system of theology. And why not? We feel ourselves committed to the stern truths of the Bible even though those truths may be uncomfortable or counterintuitive. We seek to bring our minds in subjection to truth, regardless of the cost. This commitment to truth brings us necessarily into the realm of logic, which is the science of truth and falsity.

Calvinist theologians have historically resorted to logic as an arbiter. I was reminded of this by a comment in an article by John Hendryx at reformationtheology.com. The article is entitled "The Amyraldian View Undone." In that article, Hendryx quotes B. B. Warfield as saying that Amyraut's view is "a logically inconsistent and therefore unstable form of Calvinism."

In his article, Hendryx equates Amyraldianism with four-point Calvinism. From what little I know of Amyraut's theology, I believe this is an inaccurate representation of Amyraut, though the term "Amyraldianism" has come to be associated in the minds of many with four-point Calvinism. Without conceding that particular point, I wish to treat this question: is four point Calvinism logically inconsistent?

In one of the comments posted in response to Hendryx's article, Bob Hayton provided a link to a brief article by Dr. Kevin Bauder. (http://www.centralseminary.edu/publications/20050204.pdf) Bauder points out that all Christians (apart from absolute universalists) agree that the application of Christ's atonement is limited to believers. Four-point Calvinists would agree with their higher Calvinist friends that the application of the atonement is intended only for the elect. But Bauder asks about the provision of salvation, not the application of salvation. Has Christ died to provide salvation for all men, though the application of salvation is limited to the elect? Bauder asserts -- quite correctly -- that if we distinguish between the provision of salvation and the application of salvation, it is perfectly logical to assert that Christ died to provide salvation for all men and to apply salvation only to the elect.

I posed this argument to Hendryx in the comment section of his blog. He responded that he had shown the "inconsistency of the fact that four-point calvinists fail to connect the effectual work of the Holy Spirit to the work of Christ on the cross." Hendryx has simply missed the point. The four-point Calvinist could agree completely that Christ's work on the cross obtains or purchases the work of the Holy Spirit on behalf of the elect. But that is not the question. The simple response to Hendryx's argument is that the effectual work of the Holy Spirit relates to (using Bauder's terms) application, not provision.

Hendryx fails to "undo" Amyraldianism, or even Amyraldianism's illegitimate heir, four-point Calvinism, through a misunderstanding of the logic involved.

Steve

P.S. I hasten to add that the theory that Christ "purchased" or "obtained" the work of the Holy Spirit on behalf of the elect is a highly questionable one in this writer's opinion. I would urge my readers to reconsider this issue. But this relates more to systematic theology than logic, so I'll leave the question for others for the time being. :-)

Technorati Tags: Calvinism, John Calvin, Amyraldianism, four point, 4 point, limited atonement, unlimited atonement