Is James White a Hyper-Calvinist? - Part 2

In my first article in this series, entitled "Is James White a Hyper-Calvinist?" I gave an overview of White's problem and the Biblical reason for entering into the difficulties James White alleges. Those problems are (probably among others he would name if pressed)

• The Two-Wills "conundrum"
• The "partial desire" and sovereignty problem
• "God wills the salvation of all men" is a meaningless statement.

I propose to answer these problems, insofar as I have been able to find an answer in the reformed literature. Admittedly, my answers will not be satisfactory to many, but I hope they may help some whose minds are not biased one way or the other and provide encouragement to those who are inclined to reject hyper-Calvinism.

I'm going to tackle these problems one at a time. This post will deal with the "two-wills conundrum," and the rest will have to wait for another day -- hopefully in the not-too-distant future.

Why enter into this question?

As I said in my previous blog post, I am not so concerned with whether White is or is not a hyper-Calvinist (though I think this is a legitimate concern), but whether good Bible interpretation is being upheld and the doctrines of the Christian faith adhered to.

The reason for entering into this debate is that White has denied, and leads others to deny, that God has any meaningful will for the salvation of the reprobate. The scripture plainly teaches the opposite of what White has claimed, and that is the bottom line for entering into the discussion. It is also the bottom line for tackling the admittedly difficult problems that accompany the Biblical concepts.

The "two-wills conundrum"

White has alleged that viewing certain passages of the Bible as teaching that God wills the salvation of those who are destined never to believe, forces us into an awkward position. Here's White again:

Yeah, and that's one of the problems I have with Ezekiel 18 or 33 being read into this particular issue, because I feel like we're being forced to somehow attribute to God some kind (for some reason)...some kind of an attitude or desire that I just never see, not only do I never see expressed, but it would likewise force us to say that God has an unfulfilled desire, but it's not really the same desire as he chooses to fulfill with other people. And we're left not only--you're not only left with the two-wills conundrum, now you've got multiple desires conundrums, which I don't, I just don't see a reason for it.

~James White, from transcript of Dividing Line radio program at Theological Meditations.

According to White, attributing beneficent motives and desires to God in respect of the offer of salvation to the non-elect involves us in conundrums. God would have to have two wills: a will that decrees the damnation of some men, and a desire that those very men not be damned.

First, I would note that this is the very objection that most Arminians would raise against Calvinism! Election cannot be true, they would say, because it would involve God in willing the damnation of some men whom he has expressly said he loves. The Arminian objection and White's objection are one, the respective parties simply solve the problem in a different way. Both sides agree that the doctrines of election and universal love cannot both be true. One side rejects God's love for all men and the other side rejects the sovereign purpose of God in election.

Both are equally unbiblical, and both rest on the same philosophical objection.

Calvin's answer

Calvin, in answering an imagined objection against the doctrine of election based on Matthew 23:37 ("O Jerusalem, Jerusalem..."), answers by maintaining both God's love for all men and the sovereign election of God, while flatly denying that God has two wills in the matter.

But this will of God, of which we speak, must be defined. For it is well known what exertions the Lord made to retain that people, and how perversely from the highest to the lowest they followed their own wayward desires, and refused to be gathered together. But it does not follow that by the wickedness of men the counsel of God was frustrated. They object that nothing is less accordant with the nature of God than that he should have a double will. This I concede, provided they are sound interpreters. But why do they not attend to the many passages in which God clothes himself with human affections, and descends beneath his proper majesty? He says, "I have spread out my hands all the day unto a rebellious people," (Isa. 65:1), exerting himself early and late to bring them back. Were they to apply these qualities without regarding the figure, many unnecessary disputes would arise which are quashed by the simple solution, that what is human is here transferred to God. Indeed, the solution which we have given elsewhere (see Book 1, c. 18, sec. 3; and Book 3, c. 20, sec. 43) is amply sufficient: viz. that though to our apprehension the will of God is manifold, yet he does not in himself will opposites, but, according to his manifold wisdom (so Paul styles it, Eph. 3:10), transcends our senses, until such time as it shall be given us to know how he mysteriously wills what now seems to be adverse to his will.

~Calvin, Institutes 3.24.17, emphasis added.

Calvin calls us back from idle speculation and would have us simply accept the truths plainly taught in the scripture, holding our philosophical objections in abeyance until we are given to know more fully the mysteries of God's will.

The answer of R.L. Dabney

Dabney goes slightly further than Calvin. He attempts to explain the complexity of the Divine psychology in this matter, and raises and answers a possible objection of an opponent. The objection is this: if God is all-powerful, then he must be capable of fulfilling his wishes, and no propension would go unfulfilled. Since God is all-powerful, if he really has decreed whatsoever comes to pass, he could have no inclination to be merciful to sinners who ultimately receive no mercy. Here are Dabney's words in answer:

Now, it is obvious that this reply proceeds on the following assumption: that if the obstacle of physical inability be removed in God, by his consciousness of omnipotence, there cannot be any other rational ground, in the view of God's omniscience, that may properly counterpoise or hold back the propension of mercy. But the statement of this is its sufficient exposure. It must always be exceedingly probable that an all-wise mind may see, among the multifarious concerns of his vast kingdom, good reasons for his action, of which we cannot have the least conception.

* * *

When we have admitted this, we have virtually admitted that God may see, in his own omniscience, a rational ground other than inability for restraining his actual propension of pity towards a given sinner. The first objection, then, however plausible in appearance, is found to be empty. And it is especially to be noted, that while it professes a zeal for God's infinitude, it really disparages it. Our position is, after all, the modest and reverential one.

~R. L. Dabney, God's Indiscriminate Proposals of Mercy, As Related to His Power, Wisdom, and Sincerity, quoted at Spurgeon.org.

Thus Dabney, too, would call us from idle speculation and call us immodest for raising the objection.

The attempt to reconcile God's sovereignty with universal love is, indeed, a difficult one. But we should not allow the difficulty to push us into unbelief. It is my contention that the Arminians and the hyper-Calvinists both (and White ... whether he be classified as a hyper-Calvinist or no) have allowed the difficulty to push them into doubting the plain witness of the Bible.

The Incongruity of Unlimited Atonement - Part II

If there is an incongruity in the idea of unlimited atonement, it cannot be rooted in a conflict between the members of the Trinity but in an incongruity between election, particular redemption, and the effectual call on the one hand and general love, universal atonement, and the free offer of the gospel on the other. There is no conflict between the members of the Holy Trinity, but an apparent conflict within God's plan.

The conflict exists between two manifestations of God's will: God's will of decree as opposed to God's revealed will. That such a tension exists between God's decretive will and His revealed will is obvious from many passages of scripture. When Jesus taught us to pray "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," he implicitly taught us that God's revealed will does not always come to pass despite God's desire that it should come to pass. Or take the occasion of Jesus' lamentation over Jerusalem. He said, "how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!" (Matthew 23:37.) Here Jesus strongly expressed the revealed will of God, which God did not see fit to bring about through His will of decree. I believe the conflict is also seen in Christ's prayer in Gethsemane. (I am unwilling to consign Jesus' cry for deliverance to his human nature only.)

To return to the pressing question for unlimited atonement, how could it be that God could love a sinner -- love him enough to send His only Son to die for that sinner -- and yet consign him to eternal damnation without mercy? One must, of course, appeal to mystery at this point. R. L. Dabney writing on this question urges us to modesty in analyzing the infinite mind:

Let one take this set of facts. Here is a company of sinners; God could convert all by the same powers by which He converts one. He offers His salvation to all and assures them of His general benevolence. He knows perfectly that some will neglect the offer; and yet, so knowing, He intentionally refrains from exerting those powers, to overrule their reluctance, which He is able to exert if He chose. This is but a statement of stubborn facts; it cannot be evaded without impugning the omniscience, or omnipotence of God, or both. Yet, see if the whole difficulty is not involved in it. Every evangelical Christian, therefore, is just as much interested in seeking the solution of this difficulty as the Calvinist. And it is to be sought in the following brief suggestions. God's concern in the transgression and impenitence of those whom He suffers to neglect His warnings and invitations, is only permissive. He merely leaves men to their own sinful choice. His invitations are always impliedly, or explicitly conditional; suspended on the sinner's turning. He has never said that He desires the salvation of a sinner as impenitent; He only says, if the sinner will turn, he is welcome to salvation. And this is always literally true; were it in the line of possibilities that one non-elect should turn, he would find it true in his case. All, therefore, that we have to reconcile is these three facts; that God should see a reason why it is not proper, in certain cases, to put forth His almighty grace to overcome a sinner's reluctance; and yet that He should be able to do it if He chose; and yet should be benevolent and pitiful towards all His creatures. Now God says in His Word that He does compassionate lost sinners. He says that He could save if He pleased. His word and providence both show us that some are permitted to be lost. In a wise and good man, we can easily understand how a power to pardon, a sincere compassion for a guilty criminal, and yet a fixed purpose to punish, could co-exist; the power and compassion being overruled by His wisdom. Why may not something analogous take place in God, according to His immutable nature? Is it said: such an explanation implies a struggle in the breast between competing considerations, inconsistent with God's calm blessedness? I reply, God's revelations of His wrath, love, pity, repentance, &c., are all anthropopathic, and the difficulty is no greater here, than in all these cases. Or is it said, that there can be nothing except a lack of will, or a lack of power to make the sinner both holy and happy? I answer: it is exceeding presumption to suppose that, because we do not see such a cause, none can be known to God!

Robert L. Dabney, Systematic Theology, pages 245-246. The modest position is to allow mystery where scripture speaks clearly and logic fails us.

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The Incongruity of Unlimited Atonement

While I hold to a version of Limited Atonement, I also hold to a version of Unlimited Atonement. As I mentioned in my first blog entry, I hold to unlimited atonement (as defined by W. G. T. Shedd,) and limited atonement (as defined by R. L. Dabney). The difference between these two theologians is partly in their definitions of "atonement." When Dabney used the term, he meant actual reconciliation, while Shedd used the term in the way that most modern Calvinists would. Despite the difference in definition, they both believed that Christ's work was for everyone without distinction. The limitation in the atonement is in the application, which is for the elect alone -- by grace through faith.

So I am a five-point Calvinist of a sort. My previous blog entry, though, was in defense of four-point Calvinism. I mentioned there that four-point Calvinism is not logically inconsistent, B. B. Warfield to the contrary notwithstanding.

There is nothing illogical here provided we keep in mind the distinction between provision on the one hand and application on the other (borrowing Dr. Kevin Bauder's terms [scroll down to find the article entitled "The Logic of Limited Atonement"]). We could better use the terms Dabney and Shedd used. They taught the same concept by distinguishing between expiation and atonement -- as per Dabney -- or between atonement and redemption -- as per Shedd.

There does seem to be something wrong with the scheme, though. Here is the problem: If we understand the eternal counsel of God properly, the Father elected certain ones to be given to the Son as his people. Thus the saving and efficacious love of the Father is bestowed on the elect alone. If we view Christ's work on the cross as being universal, then the Son died for all men, regardless of the particular love of the Father for the elect. So the Father's work in salvation is limited and particular, while the Son's work in salvation is unlimited and general. Though there may be nothing illogical about this in the strict sense, there certainly does seem to be something incongruous about it. Why would the Son do a work of sacrifice that is seemingly so out of step with the particularity of the decree of election?

The incongruity is really only a misunderstanding. If we think of God as having both a general will that all men be saved and a special will that the elect be saved (1Timothy 4:10), then we must think of each member of the Holy Trinity as agreeing with such a purpose and contributing to that purpose.

Thus, the Father loves the world in general and has a special love for the elect (compare Matthew 5:44-45, John 3:16, John 6:32, Romans 2:4, and 1John 4:14 with Ephesians 1:4 and cognates). The Son gave his life for the world and especially those that believe (compare John 3:16, John 12:47, and 1John 2:2, with Ephesians 5:25 and 1Timothy 4:10). The Holy Spirit draws all men generally, and the elect efficaciously (compare Revelation 22:17 with 2Thessalonians 2:13).

Thus there is no conflict between a general work of Christ on the one hand and a particular electing decree of the Father and the effectual call of the Holy Spirit on the other hand. Rather, there is a general love of God for all men and a saving purpose concordant with that love in which every member of the Holy Trinity participates. And there is a particular love of God for His elect people with an efficacious saving purpose concordant with that love in which every member of the Holy Trinity also participates.

More on this in the next blog entry.

R L Dabney's View - Expiation is Not Limited! - Part II

Dabney distinguished between expiation, which is Christ's work on behalf of sinners, and atonement, which is actual reconciliation -- "at-one-ment".  Here is a quote from Dabney's Systematic Theology apropos to the subject:

It seems plain that the vagueness and ambiguity of the modern term 'atonement,' has very much complicated the debate.  This word, not classical in the Reformed theology, is used sometimes for satisfaction for guilt, sometimes for the reconciliation ensuing thereon; until men on both sides of the debate have forgotten the distinction.  The one is cause; the other effect.  The only New Testament sense the word atonement has is that of katallage, reconciliation.  But expiation is another idea.  Katallage is personal.  Exilasmos is impersonal.  katallage is multiplied, being repeated as often as a sinner comes to the expiatory blood: exilasmos is single, unique, complete; and, in itself considered, has no more relation to one man's sins than another.  As it is applied in effectual calling, it becomes personal, and receives a limitation.  But in itself, limitation is irrelevant to it.  Hence, when men use the word atonement, as they so often do, in the sense of expiation, the phrases, 'limited atonement,' 'particular atonement,' have no meaning.  Redemption is limited, i.e., to true believers, and is particular.  Expiation is not limited."

Page 528.  Sorry about the transliteration of the Greek.  I don't care to figure out how to do Greek fonts for the blog.

Many modern day Calvinists of the Presbyterian and Reformed Baptist variety would balk at this, but Dabney clearly doesn't wish to limit the expiatory work of Christ.  The reconciliation that is the effect of the expiation clearly is limited to believers; but Christ's work itself is not limited.  Here is where the old formula, "sufficient for all, efficient for the elect" seems just right.  The expiation is sufficient for all, intended for all, and offered to all.  Whereas the reconciliation effected by that expiation is efficient only for believers and intended only for believers.  How this interacts with the doctrine of election is the subject for the next blog.

To close, here is Calvin's comment, in part, on 1John 2:2, where he approves the formula "sufficient for all, efficient for the elect":

"Here a question may be raised, how have the sins of the whole world been expiated? I pass by the dotages of the fanatics, who under this pretense extend salvation to all the reprobate, and therefore to Satan himself. Such a monstrous thing deserves no refutation. They who seek to avoid this absurdity, have said that Christ suffered sufficiently for the whole world, but efficiently only for the elect. This solution has commonly prevailed in the schools. Though then I allow that what has been said is true, yet I deny that it is suitable to this passage...."

Technorati Tags: Dabney, Calvin, Limited, Atonement, Calvinism

R L Dabney's View - Expiation is Not Limited! - Part I

R L Dabney , one of the great American Presbyterian theologians of the 19th century, was certainly no Amyraldian. There are (at least) two sections in his Systematic Theology opposing the doctrine of Amyraut. And yet Dabney makes this rather startling assertion: "Expiation is not limited." (Systematic
Theology, Banner of Truth, 1985, p. 528.)

How can a man who holds to TULIP (as Dabney plainly does) make a statement which seems on the face of it so antithetical to the central point? How exactly does this work? The question is a difficult one and will require us to put aside prejudice and emotion, at least for a time. I propose to make an attempt to explain Dabney’s answer to this question in a series of short essays.

We must start with definitions — especially since Dabney makes such a big deal of them. This is the hard part; but it is critical and will greatly repay the tedious work.

Atonement — Dabney does not like this word as descriptive of Christ’s work. Dabney gives credence to that old saw that "atonement" can be defined as "at-one-ment." (I used to scoff at this notion until Dabney taught me to behave myself.) That is, atonement — for Dabney — has a proper synonym in "reconciliation." (id, p. 503.)

Satisfaction — Instead of "atonement" as a general descriptive term for Christ’s work for sinners, Dabney perefers the word "satisfaction." He prefers it because it has been commonly used in reformed theology, and because it is general enough to include both Christ’s active and passive obedience. (id.)

Expiation — I shall quote Dabney directly: "Expiation is the sacrificial and satisfactory action, making the offended Judge propitious to the transgressor." (p. 505.) It seems to me — biased observer though I am — that most evangelicals use "atonement" to mean what Dabney means here by "expiation."

More on this tomorrow. I shall end with a quote from John Calvin. This is from his commentary to Romans 5:18: "He makes this favor common to all, because it is propounded to all, and not because it is in reality extended to all; for though Christ suffered for the sins of the whole world, and is offered through God's benignity indiscriminately to all, yet all do not receive him."


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