Two Wills in Calvin's Institutes

Just a quick one today; I'll have another entry in my critique of Roger Nicole shortly (later this week, D.V.).

D.V.: it means "God willing." But there are two senses of God's will. This is much disputed by some, who seem unable (or unwilling) to speak of God having a will apart from his decree. (There are some on the other side, of course, who are unwilling to speak of God's decree.)

Calvin, as you should know, spoke of both God's revealed will and his will of decree. Here's a quote I came across today. I've probably referred to this quote in this space before ... but, if such be the case, it bears repeating:

Why, then, they ask, should the thief be punished for robbing him whom the Lord chose to chastise with poverty? Why should the murderer be punished for slaying him whose life the Lord had terminated? If all such persons serve the will of God, why should they be punished? I deny that they serve the will of God. For we cannot say that he who is carried away by a wicked mind performs service on the order of God, when he is only following his own malignant desires. He obeys God, who, being instructed in his will, hastens in the direction in which God calls him. But how are we so instructed unless by his word? The will declared by his word is, therefore, that which we must keep in view in acting, God requires of us nothing but what he enjoins. If we design anything contrary to his precept, it is not obedience, but contumacy and transgression. But if he did not will it, we could not do it. I admit this. But do we act wickedly for the purpose of yielding obedience to him? This, assuredly, he does not command. Nay, rather we rush on, not thinking of what he wishes, but so inflamed by our own passionate lust, that, with destined purpose, we strive against him. And in this way, while acting wickedly, we serve his righteous ordination, since in his boundless wisdom he well knows how to use bad instruments for good purposes.

Calvin, Institutes 1.17.5

The reader with even the slightest sense will recognize that Calvin speaks both of God's will as revealed in the scripture, which disobedient men refuse to do, and God's will of providence, which, if He did not will it, they could not do it.

Selah.

Nicole v. Calvin on Ezekiel 18:32 and 2Peter 3:9

Well ... I suppose one must devote a certain amount of energy to a blog if he intends to have one. So, back to the grind.

Roger Nicole’s third rebuttal against the moderate (or “historic” or “non-continuity”) Calvinists is this:

3. Calvin, they urge, ["they" referring to the moderate Calvinists, such as R.T. Kendall, Curt Daniel, et. al. - slc] takes at face value certain biblical texts which appear to teach God’s universal saving will. Here Calvin’s Commentaries on Ezek 18:32 and on 2 Pet 3:9 are often quoted.

To this we reply that with respect to Ezek 18:32 as well as to 2 Pet 3:9, Calvin expressly distinguished between the revealed, preceptive will of God by virtue of which an appeal may be extended to all humans, and the secret, decretive will of God which draws unto him only the elect. The very strong language Calvin uses in his comments on these passages relates to the obligation to present an indiscriminate universal invitation, as already noted under 2 above.

Nicole is certainly correct on this point. But it doesn't answer the objection; in fact, it seems to concede the objection. Nicole admits that Calvin uses "very strong language," but he limits (or seems to limit ... Nicole's reply is not completely clear to me) the strong language to the church's obligation to present the gospel. But Nicole has this (if I'm reading him right) 180 degrees wrong. Calvin does not speak of our obligation to present the gospel, but God's nature in His gracious invitation to embrace the gospel. Here's an excerpt from Calvin:

Meanwhile Ezekiel announces this very truly as far as doctrine is concerned, that God wills not the death of him that perishes: for the explanation follows directly afterwards, be you converted and live. Why does not God delight in the death of him who perishes? Because he invites all to repentance and rejects no one. Since this is so, it follows that he is not delighted by the death of him who perishes: hence there is nothing in this passage doubtful or thorny, and we should also hold that we are led aside by speculations too deep for us. For God does not wish us to inquire into his secret counsels: His secrets are with himself, says Moses, (Deuteronomy 29:29,) but this book for ourselves and our children.

Calvin, Comm. Ezekiel 18:32.

Notice that Calvin does not pose the question this way: "to whom must we proclaim the gospel?" Calvin asks rather, "Why does not God delight in the death of him who perishes?" Nicole would have us see Calvin as speaking to our duty. But in fact, Calvin speaks to God's merciful nature as shown in His gracious proposals. A similar objection could be made regarding 2Peter 3:9:

Not willing that any should perish. So wonderful is his love towards mankind, that he would have them all to be saved, and is of his own self prepared to bestow salvation on the lost. But the order is to be noticed, that God is ready to receive all to repentance, so that none may perish; for in these words the way and manner of obtaining salvation is pointed out. Every one of us, therefore, who is desirous of salvation, must learn to enter in by this way.

But it may be asked, If God wishes none to perish, why is it that so many do perish? To this my answer is, that no mention is here made of the hidden purpose of God, according to which the reprobate are doomed to their own ruin, but only of his will as made known to us in the gospel. For God there stretches forth his hand without a difference to all, but lays hold only of those, to lead them to himself, whom he has chosen before the foundation of the world.

Calvin, Comm. 2Peter 3:9

Again notice that Calvin is not speaking of our obligation, but of God's nature.

Many Calvinists seem to speak of God's revealed will as if it is merely a declaration: a bare statement of our duty. Nicole seems to imply something similar. Since (Nicole seems to say) the strong statements in Ezekiel and 2Peter address God's revealed will, it says nothing about God's real will. For Nicole, the revealed will speaks merely of our obligation, not God's nature.

As we've already seen, this does serious injustice to Calvin's plain language; but it also does injustice to God's clear declarations about His own nature. When God speaks of his revealed "will," we dare not brush aside such statements as if they say nothing about God's "real" will. His revealed will is every bit as "real" as his will of decree. And God's revealed will is far more relevant to us, for it describes not only God's good pleasure, but also our duty.

A Word in Favor of Limited Atonement

All Christians believe in limited atonement. The atonement does not save all men.

Arminians believe that the atonement is unlimited even though some men are not saved. What they mean is that Christ's work is intended for all men and any man equally and without any distinction. The limitation is strictly man's doing. Man exercises his free will and the way he exercises his will determines whether the atonement does him saving good. God's intention is universal and the application of the benefits of the atonement is particular, i.e., to those who believe.

Some Calvinists take the opposite view: Christ's atonement is intended for the elect exclusively and this limitation of intention limits the application. In this case both God's intention and the application of the benefits are particular.

In both the Arminian scheme and the Calvinistic, the application is particular. Only those who believe will be saved. The important difference between these two views is in the intention of God; in the one case it is strictly universal and in the other case it is strictly particular.

Are these the only possible positions? Some Calvinists take a different view of God's intention: a middle road or tertium quid. These Calvinists see both a universal intention and a particular intention in God's purposes and in the atonement itself. This is the position that I am advocating in this blog. I believe it is the position of John Calvin.

As I pointed out in a previous two-part blog post regarding the unity of the Trinity, (entitled "The Incongruity of Limited Atonement) the particular intention is reflected in the decree of election and the effectual call, while the universal intention is reflected in God's universal love (Matthew 5:45) and the general call (Acts 17:30).

Many who hold the "L" in TULIP these days, hold it strictly, i.e., they hold that the intention and the application are equally limited. I suggest that one can hold the "L" while also holding that there are universal aspects in the atonement, as there are universal aspects in God's love and in the call of the gospel. This involves no conflict within the Trinity.

These divergent intentions in God — universal and particular — are generally said to reflect different aspects of God's will (or even "two wills" in God). The particular intention is — prior to its execution in history — known only to God, while the universal intention is declared to all (in principle, though not in actuality) through revelation. These intentions correspond to God's secret will and His revealed will.

The secret will and the revealed will are often (usually?) at variance from one another, but we ought not (it seems to me) to consider one as "more real" than the other. The secret will is not more real because it is actually carried into fruition, nor is it less real though it is often contrary to that which is revealed as God's will. For Christians committed to the authority of the scripture and the Holiness of God, both His revealed will and His secret will must be considered real, meaningful, and in keeping with His Holy character.

This may involve us in mysteries, but this cannot be avoided by any method than smoothing out one's theology to fit with one's biases. One may smooth out the theology in the Arminian way, by denying all sovereign interference in man's will. In this theology, God effectively has no secret will: man decides his own course. One may smooth out the theology in the way of certain Calvinists by exalting the secret will to primary status and relegating the revealed will to irrelevancy or nonexistence. In this theology, God effectively has no revealed will and man's volitions become meaningless.

It seems to me that both ways are wrong.

I submit that the middle way is the way of Calvin. We can see this in his commentary on 2Peter 3:9. Though this comment does not directly relate to the atonement, it does reflect Calvin's universalism in respect of God's love and his view of the secret and revealed will of God:

But the Lord is not slack, or, delays not. He checks extreme and unreasonable haste by another reason, that is, that the Lord defers his coming that he might invite all mankind to repentance.

* * *

And as to the duration of the whole world, we must think exactly the same as of the life of every individual; for God by prolonging time to each, sustains him that he may repent. In the like manner he does not hasten the end of the world, in order to give to all time to repent.

This is a very necessary admonition, so that we may learn to employ time aright, as we shall otherwise suffer a just punishment for our idleness.

Not willing that any should perish. So wonderful is his love towards mankind, that he would have them all to be saved, and is of his own self prepared to bestow salvation on the lost. But the order is to be noticed, that God is ready to receive all to repentance, so that none may perish; for in these words the way and manner of obtaining salvation is pointed out. Every one of us, therefore, who is desirous of salvation, must learn to enter in by this way.

But it may be asked, If God wishes none to perish, why is it that so many do perish? To this my answer is, that no mention is here made of the hidden purpose of God, according to which the reprobate are doomed to their own ruin, but only of his will as made known to us in the gospel. For God there stretches forth his hand without a difference to all, but lays hold only of those, to lead them to himself, whom he has chosen before the foundation of the world.

Re-read this passage in Calvin and notice some things. Notice the universality: "all mankind," "give to all time to repent," love towards mankind, all to be saved, etc. But notice also the particularity reflected in the final paragraph. The reprobate are doomed to their own ruin while God lays hold of those whom he has chosen before the foundation of the world.

More importantly for my purposes in this article, notice Calvin's reference to God's hidden purpose one the one hand and his will as made known to us in the gospel on the other hand. In God's hidden purpose, "the reprobate are doomed to their own ruin." While in God's will as expressed in the gospel, he "stretches forth his hand without a difference to all." There we have the difference between the secret will and the revealed will taught by Calvin himself. And these two aspects of God's will are particular and universal respectively.

So I do hold to limited atonement. I hold that God has a special love for his elect, which is reflected in Christ's work for his church, and results in the effectual call of the Holy Spirit. I also hold that in some ways the atonement is for all men. I hold that God has love for all men, which is reflected in his sending Christ to save the world, and results in the general call of the gospel to any who will hear.

How do I hold to limited atonement? In this way:

For therefore we both labour and suffer reproach, because we trust in the living God, who is the Saviour of all men, specially of those that believe.

1Timothy 4:10

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The Incongruity of Unlimited Atonement - Part II

If there is an incongruity in the idea of unlimited atonement, it cannot be rooted in a conflict between the members of the Trinity but in an incongruity between election, particular redemption, and the effectual call on the one hand and general love, universal atonement, and the free offer of the gospel on the other. There is no conflict between the members of the Holy Trinity, but an apparent conflict within God's plan.

The conflict exists between two manifestations of God's will: God's will of decree as opposed to God's revealed will. That such a tension exists between God's decretive will and His revealed will is obvious from many passages of scripture. When Jesus taught us to pray "thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," he implicitly taught us that God's revealed will does not always come to pass despite God's desire that it should come to pass. Or take the occasion of Jesus' lamentation over Jerusalem. He said, "how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!" (Matthew 23:37.) Here Jesus strongly expressed the revealed will of God, which God did not see fit to bring about through His will of decree. I believe the conflict is also seen in Christ's prayer in Gethsemane. (I am unwilling to consign Jesus' cry for deliverance to his human nature only.)

To return to the pressing question for unlimited atonement, how could it be that God could love a sinner -- love him enough to send His only Son to die for that sinner -- and yet consign him to eternal damnation without mercy? One must, of course, appeal to mystery at this point. R. L. Dabney writing on this question urges us to modesty in analyzing the infinite mind:

Let one take this set of facts. Here is a company of sinners; God could convert all by the same powers by which He converts one. He offers His salvation to all and assures them of His general benevolence. He knows perfectly that some will neglect the offer; and yet, so knowing, He intentionally refrains from exerting those powers, to overrule their reluctance, which He is able to exert if He chose. This is but a statement of stubborn facts; it cannot be evaded without impugning the omniscience, or omnipotence of God, or both. Yet, see if the whole difficulty is not involved in it. Every evangelical Christian, therefore, is just as much interested in seeking the solution of this difficulty as the Calvinist. And it is to be sought in the following brief suggestions. God's concern in the transgression and impenitence of those whom He suffers to neglect His warnings and invitations, is only permissive. He merely leaves men to their own sinful choice. His invitations are always impliedly, or explicitly conditional; suspended on the sinner's turning. He has never said that He desires the salvation of a sinner as impenitent; He only says, if the sinner will turn, he is welcome to salvation. And this is always literally true; were it in the line of possibilities that one non-elect should turn, he would find it true in his case. All, therefore, that we have to reconcile is these three facts; that God should see a reason why it is not proper, in certain cases, to put forth His almighty grace to overcome a sinner's reluctance; and yet that He should be able to do it if He chose; and yet should be benevolent and pitiful towards all His creatures. Now God says in His Word that He does compassionate lost sinners. He says that He could save if He pleased. His word and providence both show us that some are permitted to be lost. In a wise and good man, we can easily understand how a power to pardon, a sincere compassion for a guilty criminal, and yet a fixed purpose to punish, could co-exist; the power and compassion being overruled by His wisdom. Why may not something analogous take place in God, according to His immutable nature? Is it said: such an explanation implies a struggle in the breast between competing considerations, inconsistent with God's calm blessedness? I reply, God's revelations of His wrath, love, pity, repentance, &c., are all anthropopathic, and the difficulty is no greater here, than in all these cases. Or is it said, that there can be nothing except a lack of will, or a lack of power to make the sinner both holy and happy? I answer: it is exceeding presumption to suppose that, because we do not see such a cause, none can be known to God!

Robert L. Dabney, Systematic Theology, pages 245-246. The modest position is to allow mystery where scripture speaks clearly and logic fails us.

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